II. The Role of Intellectual Property and Services in New Zealand's Trade Policy

This section traces what New Zealand has committed to in trade negotiations, how those commitments treat services and intellectual property, and what the pattern of IP use across New Zealand industries tells us about the stakes involved.

1. Why New Zealand Invests in Trade

New Zealand's geographic position makes international trade a structural necessity rather than a policy choice. A small domestic market and geographic remoteness from major consumer centres mean that economic growth depends on access to foreign markets. For an economy of New Zealand's size, binding and enforceable market access arrangements reduce the disadvantages of distance, helping firms compete on terms that a purely bilateral relationship with a larger partner would rarely provide.[1]

2. A Rules-Based, Multi-Track Strategy

New Zealand's trade policy has been organised around a multi-track approach since the early 1990s — combining multilateral commitments through the WTO, participation in regional groupings including APEC, bilateral free trade agreements and domestic regulatory reform.[2] Each track reinforces the others. Multilateral rules set the floor, FTAs deepen access in priority markets, and domestic settings determine whether negotiated access translates into commercial outcomes.

The 2019 Trade for All report is the most comprehensive recent review of that architecture.[3] It recommended a more inclusive, evidence-based approach and placed services exports and the digital economy at the centre of New Zealand's trade future. Two of its findings are directly relevant to this project: that IP rights can both facilitate and hinder services trade, depending on how they are designed and implemented; and that New Zealand should develop evidence-based IP positions in trade negotiations, with cost–benefit analysis and greater transparency.[4] The report also emphasised the importance of preserving policy space to honour New Zealand's obligations under Te Tiriti o Waitangi, including in negotiations that affect IP and digital trade.[5]

Current government priorities reaffirm the multi-track logic with a specific target: to double the value of New Zealand's exports within a decade — through new agreements, upgrades to those in force and the removal of non-tariff barriers.[6]

3. What New Zealand Has Committed To

At the multilateral level, New Zealand's starting point is the WTO's single undertaking — the comprehensive package in which members accepted linked rules on goods, services and intellectual property together.[7] On services, New Zealand has scheduled relatively broad commitments under the GATS, with few limitations on cross-border supply (Mode 1) and commercial presence (Mode 3) in computer and related services, business and professional services, and transport.[8] On IP, New Zealand has maintained TRIPS-consistent protection and supported enforcement through the WTO dispute settlement system.

A practical complication is that the classification system behind those services commitments is dated. New Zealand's GATS schedule is built around the W/120 list and the UN Central Product Classification from the early 1990s — which predate software-as-a-service, cloud computing, platform services and streaming media.[9] Ambiguities about where a digital service sits in the schedule — under computer services, telecommunications, audiovisual, or a sector-specific heading — create uncertainty about which commitments apply. This is one reason why New Zealand joined the WTO Joint Initiative on Services Domestic Regulation and the Joint Statement Initiative on Electronic Commerce: to develop transparency and baseline rules for the digital economy where the existing schedule is silent.[10]

Recent FTAs add TRIPS-plus elements alongside their digital trade chapters, most notably extending copyright term from the TRIPS-required minimum of 50 years post-mortem to 70 years in CPTPP, the NZ–UK FTA and the NZ–EU FTA.[11]

4. How New Zealand Businesses Use IP

Within the domestic economy, the role of IP has grown substantially. Statistics New Zealand's Business Operations Survey (BOS) tracks how firms across 41 industries use IP protection — patents, trade marks, copyrights, confidentiality agreements, design registration, and other methods — every two years from 2007 to 2021.[12]

Total IP protection activity across New Zealand businesses grew by approximately 43% between 2007 and 2021. Confidentiality agreements are now the most widely used method, accounting for 28% of all IP uses in 2021. Trade marks follow at 21%. Copyrights have seen the sharpest growth in relative terms — nearly doubling in absolute numbers and rising from 9% to 12% of total uses over the period. Patents, by contrast, declined from around 10% to 9%.

The pattern differs between sector types. In knowledge-intensive services industries — computer systems design, information media, professional services and finance — confidentiality agreements are the dominant tool, used far more frequently than patents or design registrations. In the computer systems design sector specifically, confidentiality agreement use grew from 360 reported instances in 2007 to 693 in 2021. In primary and heavy industries, trade marks take precedence. This structural contrast matters for trade policy: the IP profile of services trade is not the same as the IP profile of goods trade, and the frameworks governing each reflect this only imperfectly.

The full interactive chart — filterable by year, industry and IP method — is at IP Protection Strategies.

5. Negotiations on Two Tracks

New Zealand's recent FTAs pair services and digital trade chapters with a separate IP chapter. The digital chapters add disciplines on cross-border data flows, data localisation and non-discrimination of digital products. The IP chapters maintain TRIPS-consistent baselines. Both sets of chapters are negotiated largely by separate teams, using separate model texts, with separate stakeholder consultations.[13]

The result is that the final text rarely contains provisions connecting the two. IP chapters do not explain how their standards apply when an IP right is an input to — or an output of — a scheduled service. Digital trade chapters commonly state that they do not affect IP protection and enforcement.[14] The texts assume that the two regimes are complementary.

6. What the Negotiating Record Shows

The structural split between the two tracks is not only apparent from the text of agreements — it is also reflected in what negotiators actually discuss. A quantitative analysis of trade negotiating materials across the WTO, APEC and New Zealand's bilateral FTA submissions confirms a consistent pattern: services and digital trade dominate the agenda, while IP is treated as a separate topic addressed on its own track.[15]

At the WTO, IP and services are most likely to be discussed together, principally in the context of the electronic commerce work programme. Outside that context, the two topics rarely appear in the same discussion. In APEC fora and in New Zealand's bilateral submissions, the gap is larger: services and digital trade are framed as drivers of growth and market access, while IP appears as background. The relationship is also asymmetric: when IP is the focus at the WTO it is more often linked to services, but when services are discussed, IP is frequently absent.

Salience measures — tracking the relative prominence of topics across the corpus of negotiating materials — show that "services" consistently outweighs "intellectual property" across all forums.[16] The gap is narrowest at the WTO and widest in New Zealand's own bilateral submissions, where services and digital trade dominate the framing almost entirely.

The policy implication aligns with broader international IP scholarship. Legal standards alone do not secure productive outcomes unless institutional coordination, implementation capacity and technology-transfer pathways are addressed together.[17]

This does not mean IP is unimportant to New Zealand's trade policy. It confirms that the two topics are, in practice, compartmentalised in how they are prepared, presented and negotiated — a pattern that mirrors the structural split visible in agreement texts, and that has not yet been tested for coherence in the real world.

Section III examines whether that assumption holds, and identifies where it does not.


  1. WTO Trade Policy Review: New Zealand — Report by New Zealand WT/TPR/G/426 (6 April 2022) at [1.2] (noting that trade "remains key to achieving the Government's goals"); WTO Trade Policy Review: New Zealand — Report by the Secretariat WT/TPR/S/426 (6 April 2022) at 11 para [1.4] (highlighting New Zealand's reliance on multilateral arrangements given small market size, remoteness and limited participation in global value chains). ↩︎

  2. Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade New Zealand Trade Policy: Implementation and Directions: A Multi-Track Approach (Wellington, 1993) at [iii]–[v] [MFAT Multi-Track Approach]. ↩︎

  3. Trade for All Advisory Board Report of the Trade for All Advisory Board (November 2019) at 12–15, 27–32, 58–59 [Trade for All Report]. ↩︎

  4. Trade for All Report, above n 3, at 58–59. ↩︎

  5. Trade for All Report, above n 3, at 16, 41 para [60]. ↩︎

  6. Hon Todd McClay Fighting for Kiwis in Trade (New Zealand Government, Speech delivered at Auckland Trade and Economic Policy School, 21 November 2024) <www.beehive.govt.nz>. ↩︎

  7. General Agreement on Trade in Services, WTO Agreement 1867 UNTS 187 (signed 15 April 1994, entered into force 1 January 1995) [GATS]; Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, WTO Agreement 1869 UNTS 299 (signed 15 April 1994, entered into force 1 January 1995) [TRIPS Agreement]; Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization 1867 UNTS 3 (signed 15 April 1994, entered into force 1 January 1995) [WTO Agreement]. ↩︎

  8. New Zealand — Schedule of Specific Commitments GATS/SC/62 (15 April 1994) [NZ GATS Schedule], Sectors 1.A (professional services), 1.B (computer and related services), 11 (transport services). ↩︎

  9. WTO Services Sectoral Classification List — Note by the Secretariat MTN.GNS/W/120 (10 July 1991); UN Department of International Economic and Social Affairs Provisional Central Product Classification ST/ESA/STAT/Ser.M/77 (1991). ↩︎

  10. WTO Declaration on the Conclusion of Negotiations on Services Domestic Regulation WT/L/1129 (2 December 2021); WTO Joint Statement on Electronic Commerce WT/L/1056 (25 January 2019). ↩︎

  11. Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership NZTS 2018/10 (signed 8 March 2018, entered into force 30 December 2018) [CPTPP], art 18.63; Free Trade Agreement between New Zealand and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (signed 28 February 2022, entered into force 31 May 2023) [NZ–UK FTA], art 16.18; Free Trade Agreement between New Zealand and the European Union (signed 9 July 2023, entered into force 1 May 2024) [NZ–EU FTA], art 17.26; compare TRIPS Agreement, art 12 (minimum 50 years post-mortem). ↩︎

  12. Statistics New Zealand "Business Operations Survey — IP protection strategies by industry" table BUO021AA (last updated 25 March 2022) https://infoshare.stats.govt.nz. ↩︎

  13. WTO General Council Advancing Work on the E-Commerce Work Programme — Communication from Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Colombia, Hong Kong China, Republic of Korea, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Republic of Moldova, Myanmar, New Zealand, Nigeria, Qatar and Singapore JOB/GC/132/Rev.1 (26 July 2017) at [1.3] (noting that "compartmentalised conversations make it hard to recognise synergies" across goods, services and IP tracks). ↩︎

  14. NZ–EU FTA (2024), art 12.11(4)(c) (providing that the digital trade chapter "shall not affect the protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights"). ↩︎

  15. Nikita Melashchenko "Intellectual Property and Services in Digital Trade: Identifying Linkages and Trade Policy Gaps" (2026) (forthcoming) [Melashchenko 2026]; "IP–Services Research Project" (repository, accessed 31 May 2026) New Zealand Centre of International Economic Law (NZCIEL) <github.com/nzciel/research-ip-services>. ↩︎

  16. Nikita Melashchenko "Two Regimes, One Market: IP–Services Linkages and New Zealand's Trade Policy" (2025) 56 VUWLR (preprint available at https://doi.org/10.25455/wgtn.31062634); Melashchenko 2026, above n 18. ↩︎

  17. Susy Frankel "International Intellectual Property, Innovation, Technology Transfer and Sustainable Development" in Christophe Geiger (ed) Intellectual Property, Ethical Innovation and Sustainability: Towards a New Social Contract for the Digital Economy (Edward Elgar, 2025) preprint available at https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5513818. ↩︎